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ABSTRACT 
 
Do Pro-Poor Schools Reach Out to the Poor? 
Location Choice of BRAC and ROSC Schools in Bangladesh* 
 
Non-formal schools play an increasingly important role in the delivery of educational services 
in poor communities, but little systematic evidence is available about their placement choices. 
We study location choice of “one teacher, one classroom” non-formal primary schools 
pioneered by BRAC vis-a-vis its first large scale replication under the government managed 
Reaching-Out-of-School (ROSC) project using school census data. Comparison is also made 
to another pro-poor educational institution – state recognized madrasas. We find that all three 
types of schools have a statistically significant presence in poor sub-districts within a district. 
However BRAC schools avoid pockets that lack public infrastructure and suffer from low 
female literacy rate while ROSC schools better target regions that have poor access to cities 
and roads, are less urbanized, more vulnerable to natural disasters, have fewer banks and 
working toilets. ROSC schools also have greater presence in regions that are under-served 
by government and government supported formal primary schools. On the contrary, the 
supply of BRAC schools and madrasas is significantly and positively linked to the presence of 
formal primary schools. Concerns over operational viability may explain why BRAC often 
leaves out remote regions where socio-economic circumstances are most likely to keep 
children out of school. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Non-formal schools have become a popular option for education service delivery in 
poor communities around the world. In Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Afghanistan and Mali, the complementary non-formal programs support small classes 
located in remote villages where rural children previously had almost no access to 
schooling (Waldman 2003; DeStefano et al. 2007). Studies show that non-formal 
schools effectively provide an alternative to formal primary education and succeed in 
maintaining and mainstreaming children into post-primary education (Sukontamarn 
2005; Sud 2010). This has led international development partners to support 
expansion of the model in Asia (Tran 2012; Jacinto 2014; Unson 2015) and Africa 
(Department for International Development 2013).1 Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), one of the world’s largest non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), runs a network of about 40,000 non-formal schools in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Uganda, South Sudan and Sierra Leone (Hossain and Sengupta 2009; 
Rosenberg 2013). However, the evidence on student performance in NGO-run schools 
is mixed. Some studies find positive impact (for example, Sukontamarn 2005; Khan 
and Kiefer 2007), while others report no or negative impact (for example, Arif and 
Saqib 2003). One possible explanation for differences lies in differential targeting 
rule. A negative or no impact could be driven by the fact that these schools do a better 
job in targeting the very poor and under-provided regions, which in turn lower the 
average level of student achievement compared to mainstream schools serving better-
off regions.  
 
In this context, Bangladesh offers an interesting case study for research on location 
choices of non-formal schools. Home to a large number of NGOs, the country has 
made exceptional progress in human development over the past two decades 
(Asadullah, Savoia and Mahmud 2014; UNDP 2013). Gender parity in school 
enrolment has been achieved in partnership with one of the oldest non-formal 
schooling systems in the world—BRAC-run ‘one teacher’ school.2 Started in the mid-
1980s, this schooling system served as a model for many other community-based, 
NGO-supported programs providing primary education to children from 
disadvantaged social backgrounds. Considered the largest non-formal school system 
in the world (Smith, Fraser and Schauerhammer 2015), BRAC schools account for 76 
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per cent of all NGO primary schools in Bangladesh (Kabeer, Nambissan and 
Subrahmanian 2003). This has led the Bangladeshi Government to scale up a 
modified version of the BRAC model under the ‘Reaching-out-of-school’ (ROSC) 
project. These non- or semi-formal schools provide a low-cost platform to target 
children currently out of school and living in difficult-to-reach communities. 
Bangladesh is also home to another low-cost schooling option. Thousands of state-
recognized primary madrasas (i.e. Islamic schools) operate in rural areas alongside 
NGO schools to serve poor households. Together, NGO, ROSC and madrasa schools 
account for nearly one-tenth of the total primary school enrolment in the country. 
However, little evidence is available on the choices of these three pro-poor schools. 
 
Common perception is that location choice of BRAC schools is driven by a social 
agenda, as well as cost considerations. Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee’s 
education program allegedly began in rural areas where there was no alternative to 
state-provided formal education (Ardt et al. 2005). These schools are viewed by many 
as making up for the failure of the government to set up enough public schools 
(Waldman 2003). International media commentaries also laud BRAC for setting up 
the world’s largest private, secular school system in remote rural villages and 
providing a safety net for children who drop out of state schools or who have not had 
a chance to attend school at all (The Economist 2012;3 Rosenberg 2013; Macmillan 
2015). Similarly, madrasas are widely believed to target regions where public schools 
are under-provided (Evans 2006) and attract children from poor families (Griswood 
2005; Asadullah, Chakrabarti, and Chaudhury 2015; Asadullah and Chaudhury 2016). 
An important deterrent to schooling for the poor is the inadequate number of schools 
and the consequent distance between the average residence and a school. In countries 
with poor social infrastructure in rural areas, NGO-run schools and madrasas arguably 
fill an important void. Therefore, a comparison of BRAC schools with its replication, 
not-for-profit ROSC schools, and Islamic schools provides an indirect way to examine 
the primary motivation of location choices of the former. 
 
This research is related to the small literature on the determinants of non-state school 
locations (Downes and Greenstein 1996; Barrow 2002; Downes and Greenstein 2002; 
Pal 2010). Downes and Greenstein (1996) find that private schools in the state of 
California with different religious affiliations respond differently to population 
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characteristics, which is evidence of differences in the objectives of these different 
types of private schools. In a related study, Downes and Greenstein (2002) examine 
the location choice of private schools entering the Californian schooling market and 
find that the correlates of the location choices of entrants appear to be the same as the 
determinants of the location pattern of incumbent private schools. In contrast to 
Downes and Greenstein, Barrow (2002) finds a significant negative relationship 
between private school counts and average household income of the community. I 
contribute to this literature by presenting evidence on the determinants of non-
madrasa private schools and madrasas in Bangladesh. As a by-product, this article 
also makes a contribution to the literature on NGO program placement (Sharma and 
Zeller 1999; Ravallion and Wodon 2000; Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Brass 2012; 
Mallick and Nabin 2011) and targeting of educational programs (Van Domelen 2007; 
Essuman and Bosumtwi-Sam 2013) in developing countries.  
 
I follow Downes and Greenstein (1996) and compile a dataset on the characteristics of 
the sub-districts in which primary schools are located throughout Bangladesh. The 
empirical analysis is based on a hybrid dataset that combines information from two 
Census datasets covering all registered primary and secondary schools, with 
information on local poverty, literacy rate, and road, banking and sanitary 
infrastructure. I use this unique dataset to test whether BRAC and ROSC schools 
favour poor sub-districts and target regions where public schools are under-provided. 
The results indicate that the characteristics of the population and other competing 
primary schools influence location decisions. First, compared to madrasas and BRAC 
schools, ROSC schools are found more in poor areas. Second, even after controlling 
for all other factors, poor access to sub-district infrastructure facilities is associated 
with a higher likelihood of having a ROSC school in the sub-district. Third, ROSC 
schools are more likely to be in areas with under-supply of government formal 
schools, where children have greater likelihood of being out of school. In contrast, 
while BRAC schools also show significant correlation with local poverty, their 
location choices are less sensitive to the lack of public infrastructure availability and 
unavailability of mainstream formal schools. As a matter of fact, BRAC schools (and 
madrasas) have a greater presence in sub-districts that already benefit from large 
number of formal government and government-aided non-government primary 
schools and benefit from higher female literacy rate.  
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The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the Bangladeshi 
education system, with a focus on BRAC schools and ROSC program. Section 3 
describes the conceptual framework and the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes 
the dataset used in this study. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes 
by spelling out the policy implications of the findings. 
 
2. Background: BRAC Schools and the ROSC Program in Bangladesh 
 
The Bangladeshi education sector has a complex structure, where the composition of 
the sector changes as one moves from pre-primary to secondary levels. Primary 
education in Bangladesh spans grades 1–5 and falls under the purview of the Ministry 
of Primary and Mass Education. Over 18 million students are currently enrolled in 
around 14 types of schools (Table A1). There are at least 13 types of primary schools 
in Bangladesh. Of these, 37,672 are government and 21,366 are registered non-
government schools and together they account for nearly 60 per cent of all primary 
schools and 80 per cent of all enrolled children in the country (Directorate of Primary 
Education 2012a). These two categories provide the platform for BRAC, ROSC and 
madrasa schools to operate. The BRAC and ROSC schools represent 1.62 per cent 
and 0.91 per cent, respectively, of the total enrolment. Adding Madrasa schools to 
these two, the three pro-poor schools altogether account for 9.28 per cent of the total 
primary enrolment in Bangladesh.  
 
Many mainstream formal schools suffer from various governance problems such as 
corruption, lack of transparency and inefficient use of resources. In addition, some 
often leave out children in remote communities. In response to these problems, the 
non-formal schooling system has been developed to provide ‘second chance’ 
education to those left out of the formal education system. Generally, it targets some 
selected demographic sub-groups. Starting in the late 1970s with the Escuela Nueva 
program in rural Colombia (Psacharopolous, Rojas and Velez 1993; McEwan 1998), 
the non-formal schooling movement has spread in many developing countries. 
Historically, non-formal education initiatives have been implemented in diverse forms 
such as farmer training programs, adult literacy programs and various community 
programs of instruction in health, family planning and so on (Coombs and Ahmed 
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1974). Arguably the largest and most successful non-formal education system was 
introduced in Bangladesh in 1985 by BRAC (Chabbot 2006). Later in 2000–2001, the 
program was scaled up to cover the entire 5 year primary school curriculum through a 
4 year, catch-up program. BRAC’s education programme is now universally 
recognised as a low cost but effective model to educate children who are not covered 
by formal school systems (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 2009). BRAC 
annual report 2009 states that “Our non-formal schools offer flexible timings and 
entry ages, small-sized classes taught by a female teacher from the community, free 
educational materials, hands-on teaching with student participation and little 
homework or long holidays, to accommodate children who never enrolled, or had to 
drop out of regular schools”. Other similar programs include the Community School 
program in Egypt in the early 1990s (Farrell 2004) and the School for Life program in 
Ghana in the late 1990s (Hartwell 2006). These programs are usually operated by 
non-state providers with strong community participation, they have low operational 
costs and they cater to hard-to-reach students who remain excluded from the formal 
education system for various reasons.4  
 
According to the non-formal education mapping carried out on behalf of the Bureau 
of Non-Formal Education (BNFE), there were 1.4 million students in over 53,000 
centres in 2007 in Bangladesh (Directorate of Primary Education 2012b). However, 
majority of these centres belong to BRAC which also franchises its model by sub-
contracting to 200 small NGOs to deliver non-formal education programs. A BRAC 
school consists of one teacher and one classroom that caters to out-of-school and/or 
usually marginalised children. Although BRAC schools and government public 
schools teach the same competency-based curriculum, there are three key operational 
differences between these schools: (i) student intake occurs every 4 years at the 
former but annually at the latter; (ii) the average class size is 25–30 students at the 
former but more than twice at the latter; and (iii) while the former averages 4,091 
contact hours per primary cycle, the corresponding figure at the latter is 4,046 
(Chabbott 2006). At the same time, BRAC schools have higher attendance rate (96 
per cent) and completion rate (94 per cent) than government public schools (61 and 67 
per cent, respectively) and BRAC students have higher test scores across several 
different subjects including life skills, reading, writing and numeracy.5  
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Inspired by the ‘success’ of the BRAC model, the Bangladeshi Government brought 
the Reaching Out-Of-School Children (ROSC) program into the formal schooling 
system and expanded it on a large scale (Ahmed 2006).6 Managed by the 
government’s Directorate of Primary Education and supported by the World Bank, 
local learning centres provide non-formal education to out-of-school children of ages 
7–14 years.7 Like BRAC schools, most of the teachers are women, locally recruited 
and most have secondary school certificate-level education. Beneficiary students 
come from the 90 poorest sub-districts (upazilas) of the country. The primary 
program objective is to bring out-of-school children into education through learning 
centres, called Ananda Schools (or ‘schools of joy’). Therefore, ROSC non-formal 
program also includes financial incentives in the form of stipends to underprivileged 
students, conditional on their school enrolment and performance.8 This also includes 
free books, stationery and school uniforms and helps offset the opportunity cost for 
working children. Since its inception in 2005, ROSC schools have provided ‘second 
chance’ primary education to about 5 million children, half of whom are girls, through 
more than 23,000 learning centres (UNICEF 2009).9 
 
Existing studies on non-formal schools in Bangladesh and other developing countries 
have focused on relative performance of students vis-à-vis those in formal schools. 
The evidence so far is mixed (for example, Arif and Saqib 2003; Sukontamarn 2005; 
Asadullah, Chaudhury and Dar 2007; Khan and Kiefer 2007). One explanation for the 
observed difference in findings relates to differential regional concentration of 
schools. Poor performance of students in non-formal schools may reflect the fact that 
these students belong to poor and under-developed locations, compared to those in 
formal schools. In this article, I therefore investigate the location choice of ROSC 
schools using Census data from Bangladesh. To my knowledge, this study is the first 
to evaluate the placement decision of a large-scale, government-financed, non-formal 
school program. I do not know of any previous NGO-led non-formal program that has 
been replicated and mainstreamed into the formal primary education system by the 
government. Therefore, these findings have much relevance for other countries that 
plan to undertake similar replications, given the rising popularity of non-formal 
schools.  
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Lastly, for comparison purposes, I also examine location choice of ROSC and BRAC 
schools vis-à-vis registered madrasas operating at primary level in Bangladesh. 
Similarly to BRAC schools, madrasas are entirely in the non-state sector, although 
their curricula follow government regulations as prescribed by the Madrasa Education 
Board of the government (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009). Students are taught 
subjects similar to those taught in general education primary schools in addition to a 
curriculum of religious and Arabic studies. Evidence on the determinants of madrasa 
enrolment in Bangladesh confirms a strong poverty connection, suggesting that 
madrasas are pro-poor (Asadullah, Chakrabarti and Chaudhury 2015).  
 
3. Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
 
Although little is understood about how non-state schools make location decisions, 
common perception is that they generally choose to locate where there is under-
supply of mainstream schools (Waldman 2003). Non-profit institutions often seek to 
satisfy the demand for specific public goods that are not demanded by the median 
voter and therefore are not provided by government (Weisbrod 1975). Non-
governmental organisations are essentially not-for-profit organisations devoid of 
government involvement, staffed by altruistic employees and volunteers working 
towards ideological, rather than financial, goals (Werker and Ahmed, 2008). Non-
profits may be perceived to be more trustworthy due to the non-distribution constraint 
(of profits). For these reasons, they may enjoy a competitive advantage in service 
delivery a number of areas (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001). NGO schools are also 
particularly attractive to the poor because of low (or no) student fees. In case of for-
profit private schools, affordability is an important consideration if parents are to 
choose fee-paying private schools (as against tuition fee-free state and/or non-formal 
schools). In the United States, private school count is positively related to mean 
family income of the locality (Barrow 2002). Thus, local poverty may play an 
important role: I expect that the share of non-formal, non-state schools will be higher 
in economically poorer sub-districts. At the same time, NGO schools may choose 
regional pockets within an otherwise poor district which have superior non-education 
public infrastructure (for example, roads) as it saves on operation costs and hence is 
important for financial viability. Taken together, not-for-profit NGO schools should 
thrive in areas where demand for fee-charging schools is low and/or the supply of 
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alternatives is limited, although they may avoid geographically remote pockets for 
program sustainability-related reasons. In this context, understanding the larger 
decision regarding NGO branch placement is important.  
 
To the extent that NGOs, like BRAC, operate educational services in areas with 
existing development programs, location of NGO schools would mimic that of NGO 
branches. The common perception is that NGO branches are placed in poverty-
stricken communities (Ravallion and Wodon 2000). However, the literature on NGO 
branch placement lacks consensus on the issue.10 Using sub-district level data to 
analyse the geographical placement of three credit programs, Sharma and Zeller 
(1999) present evidence that NGO branches in Bangladesh tend to be located in poor 
pockets of relatively well-developed areas rather than in remoter, less-developed 
regions. Fruttero and Gauri (2005) use nationally representative household survey 
data for 1995–2000, a period when the NGO sector expanded throughout the country. 
They found little evidence to support the view that NGO programs in a community 
are related to community needs. The authors also found that NGOs established new 
programs where they themselves had no program previously, irrespective of whether 
other NGOs were already present in the community. Simultaneously examining 
BRAC, ROSC and madrasa school location data therefore allows us to understand 
operational motives for BRAC school placement.  
 
The BRAC schools require minimal physical infrastructure (for example, one room 
with a floor space of approximately 31.21 square meter). There are only 33 students, 
on average, and one teacher in a school (Nath 2002). However, one constraint that 
may limit entry of these schools in educationally backward locations is the supply of 
educated women (Chabbott 2014). An internal study by BRAC lists four factors as the 
determinants of location choice of a BRAC school: (i) the availability of a teacher in 
the particular village; (ii) the number of boys and girls of particular age group who 
need education; (iii) the availability of a ‘bari’ (that is, a cluster of households) where 
a room may be rented for the school; and (iv) the availability of married, educated 
women (Rashid, Chowdhury and Bhuiya 1995). The majority (that is, 97 per cent) of 
teachers in BRAC schools are married women and they come from the village that the 
school is in. They are required to have completed at least 9 years of schooling and 
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attend a 15 day teacher training course before they are allowed to teach in a BRAC 
school (Ardt et al. 2005).11 
 
Taking into account the above discussion, this empirical analysis focuses primarily on 
two arguments. First, ROSC schools are driven by a common mission to serve the 
poorest in rural areas. These schools have been designed for sub-districts with high 
poverty and low enrolment and completion rates (Sarr et al. 2010). Sub-districts were 
chosen for the ROSC project based on a net enrolment rate that was lower than 85 per 
cent. Once this screening criterion was satisfied, selected upazilas had to fulfil two out 
of three of following selection criteria: (i) the gender gap in enrolment should be 
greater, at least, than 2 percentage points; (ii) the primary completion rate should not 
exceed 50 per cent; and (iii) the poverty rate should be above 30 per cent (ROSC 
Project Office Unit 2009). If this was the case, ROSC schools should be found in 
locations with above-average poverty levels where out-of-school child population is 
more likely to concentrate. Since the program is government-managed, location 
choice of ROSC schools is likely to be less affected by concerns over financial 
viability. If so, comparing ROSC location with that of NGO and madrasa schools can 
help identify non-market motives for the latter group of schools.  
 
Second, location choice should be insensitive to the availability of public 
infrastructure in the locality if ROSC schools are truly poverty-focused. To be precise, 
infrastructure variables are expected to be negative and significant predictors of 
location choice. On the other hand, BRAC schools will avoid very remote pockets in a 
poor region as this would increase operational cost and affect program viability for 
reasons such as the unavailability of married, educated women in the same village 
where the school is to be set up. Better access to public infrastructure could minimise 
the cost of operation (greater supply of local teachers) and ensure a high return to 
private investment. For India, Pal (2010) argues that the presence of certain local 
public infrastructure encourages the rise of private schools in Indian districts as it 
saves on private school production costs.12 Following Pal (2010), I additionally 
examine whether the share of BRAC schools is higher in sub-districts with more 
infrastructure facilities, compared to ROSC schools.  
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To formally test these two hypotheses, I estimate regression models where the main 
dependent variable is defined as current stock of BRAC schools in the region. I define 
the sub-district (that is, upazila) to be the relevant education market. Given that the 
outcome variable assumes count data, the determinants of the number of school 
locations are modelled using Poisson regression. In this sense, the empirical approach 
is similar to that of Downes and Greenstein (1996). In the regression function, the two 
key right-hand-side variables are: (i) lagged income of the region; and (ii) proxies for 
public infrastructure in the region. The former is proxied by population below the 
poverty line in the region. Proxy measures for infrastructure include variables such as 
travel distance to the capital (that is, Dhaka), distance from nearest road, literacy of 
household head, households with access to good toilet and local financial 
development (measured in terms of total number of bank branches). In order to ensure 
that the infrastructure variable is not picking up the effect of geography, I additionally 
control for ‘exposure to natural disaster’. Smaller habitation size can reduce the 
optimum school size and therefore limit the scope for schools to operate.13 Moreover, 
in a sparsely populated region, more schools (of small size) would be needed. 
Therefore, all regressions control for school-aged population in the sub-district.  
 
If the poverty hypothesis is valid, the coefficient on local income in the location 
regression will be negative. A positive coefficient will be obtained if BRAC schools 
behave like for-profit schools and target areas that will help them meet operating 
costs. However, if BRAC schools only target poor districts instead of poor pockets in 
well-off areas, the coefficient on local income variable will be insignificant once 
controls for district fixed effects are in place.  
 
Poor provision of public infrastructure can also take the form of lack of government 
and government-aided schools. Total number of government schools can exert a 
positive influence if practical considerations are the primary determinant of location 
choice.14 Similarly, I consider the possible effects of government school non-teaching 
inputs, including type of government school building (pucca or not) and school’s 
access to drinking water, on the share of BRAC schools in the region.15  
 
Lastly, I repeat the regression analysis using counts of ROSC and madrasa primary 
schools as dependent variables. This allows us to compare and contrast estimates of 
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BRAC location regression models with those for other types of pro-poor schools and 
to test whether BRAC location choices follow that of other non-formal schools (that 
is, ROSC schools) or whether they are more similar to existing formal pro-poor 
schools (that is, madrasa schools).  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1 Data Source and Sample Construction 
Research on school location choice is rare for developing countries because large 
spatial datasets containing information on schools by location alongside other school 
characteristics are not available in public domain. To overcome this data problem, I 
combine Census data on schools with information on regional characteristics to create 
a hybrid dataset. Each year, grade 5 students of all primary schools in Bangladesh 
participate in a national examination at the end of the schooling cycle. The primary 
source of these data is the primary school Terminal Examination of 2011. For cross-
validation purposes, I also use another independent Census dataset—Annual School 
Census (ASC)—that is used by the government for monitoring purposes. 
 
Table A1 provides a breakdown of primary schools in Bangladesh by major type. 
When compared to national examination data-based counts, ASC records agree 
broadly with Terminal Examination data on the total number of government schools, 
aided schools, ROSC schools and secondary attached schools. However, for most 
other school types, ASC data turn out to be significantly underestimated. This is 
particularly true for government-aided schools, private schools and madrasa and 
BRAC schools. The Terminal Examination records suggest a total of 99,351 primary 
schools (against 89,707 in ASC) in Bangladesh. This creates an upward bias in the 
percentage share of government primary schools in the ASC data. While 2011 ASC is 
an alternative source of rich school-level data, the survey underestimates counts of 
various types of schools.16 For this reason, the main quantitative analysis in this 
article is based on the Terminal Examination dataset. Nonetheless, I present 
supplementary evidence based on 2011 ASC data. In the empirical analysis, school-
level data are aggregated at the sub-district (thana) level, the unit of observation. 
Once aggregated at the sub-district level, sub-district data on various types of schools 
for the year 2011 were mapped on to sub-district-wide indicators of poverty level and 
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infrastructure. The latter data were obtained from various sources (as explained later). 
Lastly, in order to assess location decisions as a function of the supply of secondary 
schools, I use lagged data from 2003 Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information 
and Statistics School Census. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Information relating to institutional structure of ROSC, BRAC and madrasa schools 
(in terms of availability of teachers and size of student enrolment) is presented in 
Table 1. For comparison, data are also presented on for-profit and government 
schools. Private schools have most favourable student–teacher ratio (STR), which in 
most cases is below the government-prescribed limit of 46. Compared to government 
and non-government schools, however, student–classroom ratio (SCR) is bigger, 
suggesting that these schools comprise relatively fewer classrooms. The BRAC and 
ROSC schools, owing to their non-formal nature, have a student population averaging 
between 30 and 35. The SCR and STR for these two categories are uninformative as 
each is organised in a single room and managed by a single teacher. In case of 
madrasas, SCR is very high, although they enjoy a favourable STR. In other words, 
madrasas adopt a more labour-intensive approach to school management, employing 
more teachers and fewer classrooms.17 Of all types, government schools appear to be 
over-subscribed across all divisions, as confirmed by the total enrolled student 
population.  
 
The observed differences in inputs contrast with differences in student performance of 
various schools in 2011 Terminal Examination (see Table 1). Despite small STR, 
students of ROSC and madrasa schools have lower pass rate, compared to 
government and non-government schools. Private school students, on the other hand, 
enjoy high pass rate (93.6 per cent), consistent with a very low STR of 12.9. Yet, 
there is a big performance gap between BRAC and ROSC schools despite the fact that 
they both enjoy small STR (28 and 32, respectively). The pass rate of BRAC students 
is 95 per cent, while that for ROSC students is 46 per cent. The poor performance of 
ROSC students in national examination could be partly owing to the fact that they 
largely come from poorer socioeconomic background.18 Moreover, they are often in 
disadvantaged regions that are discarded by formal government, as well as BRAC-run 
non-formal schools.19 I examine this by studying the correlation between counts of  
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Table 1 Average Number and Characteristics of Schools in the Sub-District by Typea 
School typec 
Average 
number of 
schools  
Average number 
of schools per 
1,000 children 
(6–10 years) 
Average 
school size 
(number of 
students 
enrolled) 
Average 
number of 
students 
per 
classroom  
Average 
number of 
students per 
classroom 
40 
Average 
number of 
students per 
teacher 
Average 
number of 
students 
per teacher 
46 
Proportion 
of schools 
in remote 
locationb 
Non-formal school         
  BRACd 48.61 1.42 34.21 30.02 0.99 28.38 1.00 0.06 
  ROSCe 4.55 0.10 31.57 32.81 0.97 32.79 0.99 0.16 
         
Formal school         
  Government primary school 75.27 2.37 283.73 67.68 0.22 53.30 0.46 0.32 
  Non-government registered school 42.67 1.36 190.34 65.53 0.20 54.55 0.48 0.36 
  Private school 22.14 0.59 116.46 79.36 0.33 12.95 0.99 0.09 
  Primary madrasa 23.20 0.68 214.07 117.68 0.14 33.69 0.80 0.12 
Notes: (a) Data reported in columns 3–8 are from 2011 Annual School Census.  
(b) Remote locations include haor, char, coastal and hilly areas.  
(c) Data on primary schools, except Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), are from 2011 Terminal Examination.  
(d) Data on total number of BRAC schools are for the year 2006 and are provided by BRAC Education Program. 
(e) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
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government and non-government registered primary schools with respect to 
government and aided schools.  
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. Most of the correlation coefficients are 
positive, implying that areas that are educationally developed attract all types of 
schools. The only exception is private schools. The corresponding coefficients are 
small in size and significant when calculated with respect to schools that are 
perceived to be pro-poor; namely, BRAC (0.08), ROSC (–0.01) and primary (0.06). 
Amongst ‘pro-poor’ schools (that is, BRAC, ROSC and primary madrasa), the 
correlation coefficients are always large and positive. At the same time, correlation 
coefficients for BRAC schools are also very large and significant with respect to 
government and government-aided schools. This suggests that BRAC caters to drop-
outs from formal schools. On the other hand, compared to BRAC and madrasa 
schools, ROSC schools show smallest correlation with government primary schools, 
registered non-government primary schools and private schools. At the same time, 
they have significant correlation with BRAC and madrasa schools (correlation 
coefficients being 0.25 and 0.22, respectively). On the other hand, the correlation 
coefficient between BRAC school, with respect to government primary school, is 
threefold larger (0.37), compared to that of ROSC. Lastly, correlation coefficients for 
primary madrasas have very high values with respect to ‘non-poor’ schools; that is, 
government schools (0.58) and registered non-government schools (0.62). These 
correlations are much higher when compared to those of ROSC schools (0.22) and 
BRAC schools (0.41).  
 
In summary, it appears that BRAC, ROSC and madrasa schools are less resource-
intensive and have a larger presence in rural areas. Therefore, they are strategically 
better placed to thrive in poor communities, compared to for-profit private schools. 
The primary objective is to test whether there is a correlation between location choice 
and incidence of poverty. In addition, I want to test whether BRAC schools locate 
themselves in areas with under-provision of formal schools or in poorer regions where 
key public infrastructure is lacking. If the former, ROSC location factors should be 
similar to that of BRAC schools. If the latter, it should be similar to conventional 
schools and madrasas. The next section discusses the regression results. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix for School Count Variables (pair-wise correlations 
between variables) 
School type 
Government 
primary 
school 
Registered non-
government 
school 
Private school 
(kindergarten) ROSCa Madrasa BRACb 
Government primary school 1.00 – – – – – 
Registered non-government 
school 
0.44 1.00 – – – – 
(0.00)c – – – – – 
Private school (kindergarten) 
0.13 –0.17 1.00 – – – 
(0.00) (0.00) – – – – 
ROSC 
0.12 0.17 –0.01 1.00 – – 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.85) – – – 
Primary madrasa 
0.58 0.62 0.06 0.22 1.00 – 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) – – 
BRAC 
0.37 0.38 0.08 0.25 0.41 1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) – 
Notes: (a) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
(b) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
(c) P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Lastly, separating demand- and supply-side factors is difficult using cross-sectional 
data. Ideally, we want to study location choice of schools or madrasas that were 
recently set up as a function of initial characteristics of the region where they are 
located. Otherwise, the supply of government schools can be conditioned on the 
availability of non-state schools as much as the location of non-state schools being 
explained by the (un)availability of state schools. However, the institutional structure 
of Bangladesh’s education sector minimises the concern over simultaneity bias in the 
data. On the one hand, almost all of the government primary schools were set up on or 
before 1970; that is, long before BRAC non-formal school program was launched (see 
Table A2). On the other hand, all ROSC schools have been set up recently (that is, on 
or after 2008). Similarly, each BRAC school operates on a 4 year cycle, so that at any 
point in time, the stock of BRAC schools reflects those recently in operation. 
Therefore, current locations of government schools cannot be influenced by the 
placement of non-state schools such as ROSC and BRAC. The reverse causality 
problem does not arise because the stock of government schools is largely historical. 
Hence, indicators capturing the presence of government schools essentially enter as 
lagged variables in the regression models presented in the next section.20  
 
5. Results 
 
The main analysis focuses on the total counts of three types of pro-poor schools in the 
region. Therefore, regression models are estimated using three dependent variables, 
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counts of BRAC schools, ROSC schools and primary madrasas, in Tables 3, 4 and 5, 
which report Poisson regression estimates of determinants of school locations in 
Bangladeshi sub-districts.  
 
The primary focus is on poverty (measured in terms of population under the lower 
poverty line). Table 3 reports Poisson regression estimates of school locations with a 
focus on child population size and poverty rate in the region. Irrespective of the 
dependent variables used, the coefficient on the poverty variable is positive and 
significant in all regressions. This finding is not surprising, given that both BRAC and 
ROSC schools do not charge any fee, while madrasas only charge a nominal fee, 
hence all being more attractive to children from poor families.21 However, the 
coefficient on the poverty variable is largest in ROSC school count regression. This is 
true even after controlling for district dummies (see model 2). This confirms that 
ROSC schools do not simply go to poor districts, they also target poorer sub-districts 
within a poor district.22 
 
My next objective is to test whether school location choice is driven by under-supply 
of formal schools in the sub-district. To this end, I expand model 2 of Table 3 by 
additionally allowing for two indicators of public investment in education; namely, 
presence of primary and secondary government and government-supported schools in 
the region. Results are reported in Table 4. I use a parsimonious and a detailed 
specification. In all parsimonious specifications (model 1), the coefficient on the 
number of government primary schools is significant. While the counts of BRAC and 
madrasa schools are positively correlated with government primary schools, the 
opposite is true for ROSC schools—they have a greater concentration in sub-districts 
where government primary and secondary schools are under-supplied. Turning to the 
detailed specification (model 2), these results remain unchanged and are supported by 
observed correlations with other formal non-poor schools. For instance, ROSC 
schools are also significantly higher in sub-districts where the supply of government-
aided primary schools is limited, while their presence is significantly lower in 
urbanised sub-districts.  
 
Turning to BRAC schools, there is no evidence to suggest that these non-formal 
schools strategically place themselves in areas where there is a lack of public 
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educational investment. They have a significantly higher presence in sub-districts 
where the supply of government primary schools is also large (model 1). The effect of 
government primary schools is washed out once I additionally control for the supply 
of non-government primary and secondary schools (model 2). In general, regions with 
more non-government secondary schools attract a large number of primary schools of 
all types, except madrasas. This is not surprising, considering the fact that primary 
schools act as feeders to secondary schools. However, in regions with at least one 
government secondary school, the presence of ROSC schools is ninefold smaller than 
that of BRAC and madrasa schools. In Bangladesh, there are less than 350 secondary 
government schools, most of which were set up decades ago and have favoured areas 
with larger population density and urban facilities. This again confirms the fact that, 
compared to BRAC, ROSC schools are more likely to avoid areas that have 
historically benefited from large public investment in education. These results suggest 
that ROSC schools do a better job in targeting under-provided populations, compared 
to BRAC (and madrasa) schools. 
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Table 3 Poisson Regression Estimates of Determinants of School Locations in 
Sub-Districtsa 
ROSCb school BRACc school Madrasa 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
% Population below poverty line in 2005 0.085 0.052 0.009 0.011 0.022 0.009 
(27.110)d**e (9.900)** (7.350)** (8.770)** (26.040)** (4.970)** 
Number of 6–10 year old children  0.034 0.048 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.015 
(39.870)** (30.400)** (44.390)** (50.390)** (65.850)** (29.790)** 
Dhaka –0.056 – –0.595 – –0.238 – 
 (0.940) – (20.070)** – (12.970)** – 
Khulna 0.346 – –0.071 – 0.022 – 
 (3.590)** – (2.040)* – –0.920 – 
Chittagong –0.228 – –0.411 – –0.473 – 
 (2.760)** – (12.580)** – (20.560)** – 
Barisal 0.494 – 0.330 – –1.553 – 
 (6.100)** – (9.940)** – (31.140)** – 
Sylhet 0.870 – –0.790 – –0.249 – 
 (9.510)** – (15.320)** – (8.330)** – 
Constant –2.865 –3.762 2.450 3.279 2.740 1.514 
(18.320)** (3.710)** (44.390)** (38.230)** (69.450)** (7.320)** 
District dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 485.000 485.000 485.000 485.000 485.000 485.000 
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.490 0.320 0.520 0.310 0.470 
Notes: (a) Omitted district category is Rajshahi. 
(b) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
(c) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
(d) Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses.  
(e) * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level and ** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 4 Poisson Regression Estimates of Determinants of Primary School 
Locations in Sub-Districts Controlling for ‘Supply of Government (and 
Government-Aided) Schools’ 
ROSCa school BRACb school Madrasa 
 (1)a (2)b (1)a (2)b (1)a (2)b 
% Population below poverty line in 2005 0.047 0.048 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.004 
(8.640)c**d (7.580)** (5.580)** (2.160)* (2.500)* (1.840)+ 
Number of 6–10 year old children  0.081 0.079 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001 
(25.950)** (23.410)** (20.480)** (16.590)** (5.390)** (1.070) 
Government secondary schools present –0.928 –0.921 –0.120 –0.059 –0.085 –0.054 
(16.88)** (14.150)** (7.790)** (3.570)** (3.720)** (2.230)* 
Number of government primary schools –1.269 –1.542 0.621 0.018 0.823 0.269 
(10.140)** (10.780)** (23.870)** (0.540) (22.520)** (5.710)** 
Urban – –0.007 – –0.010 – 0.003 
 – (1.900)+ – (12.620)** – (3.010)** 
Number of non-government secondary 
schools – 0.620 – 0.590 – –0.058 
 – (4.840)** – (18.210)** – (1.230) 
Number of non-government primary 
schools – –0.207 – 0.113 – 0.770 
 – (3.270)** – (6.170)** – (26.210)** 
Constant 1.606 0.507 0.106 1.538 –1.169 –0.356 
 (1.840)+ (0.440) (0.690) (9.780)** (5.510)** (1.230) 
N 485.000 468.000 485.000 468.000 485.000 468.000 
Pseudo R2 0.520 0.520 0.550 0.580 0.540 0.650 
District dummiese Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (a) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
(b) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
(c) Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. 
(d) + denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level and ** 
denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.  
(e) In total, there are only about 350 government secondary schools (or at most one per sub-district) in 
Bangladesh. For this reason, I use a dummy indicator to capture access to government schools instead 
of totalling their counts at the sub-district level. 
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It should be noted that, even after detailed control for supply of alternative formal 
schools, the coefficient on the poverty variable still remains significant. Moreover, 
size of the coefficient does not fall in specification (2) (when we compare to model 2 
estimates in Table 3). In Table 4, for a 1 per cent increase in the population living 
below the poverty line in the sub-district, the difference in the logs of expected counts 
of ROSC schools is expected to increase by 0.047, given the other predictor variables 
in model (1) are held constant. However, the increase is much smaller in case of 
BRAC and madrasa schools; that is, respectively, 0.008 and 0.005 (see model 1 of 
Table 4). This implies that the observed poverty effect is not a proxy for under-
provision of formal schools in the sub-district. However, it is possible that these 
economically poor districts also lack public infrastructure which increases the cost of 
attending formal schools. Households in these districts may remain exposed to 
economic shocks or have poor access to roads. These may increase direct, as well as 
indirect, costs of school attendance. The ROSC schools may therefore excel by 
locating in poor sub-districts that are under-developed in terms of infrastructure 
provision.  
 
To test this (as well as examine the influence of non-income dimensions of poverty) 
formally, I revisit estimates in Table 3 by including a host of proxies for remoteness, 
transport access and economic development. Results are reported in Table 5, where I 
additionally control for geographical isolation (travel distance to the capital and 
distance from nearest road), exposure to natural disaster, proportion of illiterate 
household heads, households with access to good toilet and a proxy for local financial 
development (measured in terms of total number of bank branches).  
 
Control for the level of infrastructure washes out the effect of local poverty as a 
determinant of school concentration in the region (see model 1, Table 5). Consistent 
with the earlier findings from Table 4, BRAC schools are less likely to be in locations 
that are far from the city. On the other hand, ROSC schools and madrasas are found 
more in distant regions, although the correlation is only significant in case of the 
former. These patterns also hold when using an alternative measure of remoteness, 
distance to nearest road: ROSC schools have significantly higher presence in 
locations where the distance to nearest road is higher, while the opposite is true for 
BRAC schools. Regions with more banks seem to have a large concentration of 
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BRAC schools, while the opposite is true for ROSC schools and madrasas. In general, 
ROSC schools have a more systematic association with various proxies of local 
poverty, compared to BRAC schools. They have a greater presence in sub-districts 
with poor communication infrastructure (for example, being further away from the 
nearest road and city) and geographical vulnerability to natural disasters. The ROSC 
schools also have a higher concentration in sub-districts that are financially less 
developed or have fewer working toilets; the opposite result holds for BRAC schools.  
 
In contrast to ROSC and BRAC schools, the findings on madrasas are somewhat 
mixed. Madrasa concentration is positively associated with a number of proxies of 
poverty and infrastructure development such as higher proportion of households with 
an illiterate head, smaller proportion of households with good toilets and large 
number of bank branches per 1,000 people. Only in case of one indicator of poverty, 
vulnerability to natural disaster, is the association negative and significant. In case of 
two other indicators, travel time to nearest major city and distance to nearest road, the 
effects are not significant even though both indicators are significantly associated 
with expected counts of ROSC and BRAC schools (the association being positive and 
negative, respectively). Nonetheless, the poverty connection still holds for 
madrasas—even after detailed control for infrastructure effects in Table 5, the 
coefficient on local poverty (that is, percentage of population below poverty line in 
2005) remains significant in madrasa regression. 
 
The finding that location decision of BRAC schools is negatively related with low 
infrastructure runs contrary to the popular notion that BRAC schools charge no fee 
and manage with little to no facilities (The Economist 2012;23 Rosenberg 2013; 
Macmillan 2015; Smith, Fraser and Schauerhammer 2015). However, as explained in 
Section 3, operational considerations may discourage BRAC to set up schools in 
under-provided areas. In the context of Bangladesh, the major input to education, 
female teachers, is the main constraint to delivering educational services in rural 
areas. It is possible that low-infrastructure areas also have lower proportion of Table  
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5 Poisson Regression Estimates of Determinants of School Locations in Sub-
Districts 
ROSCa school BRACb school Madrasa 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
% Population below poverty linec in 2005 0.012 0.006 –0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 
(1.510)d (0.740) (0.920) (1.580) (1.840)+e (1.090) 
Number of 6–10 year old childrenj  0.062 0.062 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.021 
(28.920)** (29.040)** (36.200)** (38.070)** (24.100)** (13.270)** 
Travel time to nearest major cityf 0.067 0.074 –0.008 –0.010 0.004 0.007 
(7.730)** (8.320)** (2.800)** (3.560)** (1.020) (0.830) 
Distance to nearest roadg 0.233 0.299 –0.196 –0.192 –0.005 0.160 
(1.720)+ (2.210)* (5.540)** (5.430)** (0.110) (1.570) 
Vulnerability to natural disasterh 0.015 0.014 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 0.000 
(12.290)** (12.020)** (7.220)** (5.220)** (4.090)** (0.130) 
Proportion of households with an illiterate head 0.061 0.082 0.008 –0.023 0.010 –0.019 
(8.390)** (9.290)** (0.270) (10.120)** (4.230)** (2.900)** 
Proportion of households with good toilets –0.042 –0.039 –0.010 –0.012 –0.006 0.003 
(10.930)** (10.190)** (9.540)** (11.870)** (4.800)** (1.220) 
Number of bank branches per 1,000 people –0.071 –0.065 0.005 0.004 –0.005 –0.014 
(11.090)** (10.130)** (3.760)** (0.120) (2.650)** (3.410)** 
Female literacyi (%) – –0.036 – 0.041 – 0.027 
 – (4.080)** – (16.750)** – (3.890)** 
Constant –4.265 –3.215 4.072 2.875 1.461 –2.453 
(3.990)** (2.930)** (32.460)** (19.760)** (5.980)** (2.310)* 
N 485.000 484.000 485.000 484.000 485.000 484.000 
Pseudo R2 0.540 0.540 0.530 0.550 0.480 0.490 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (a) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
(b) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
(c) Sub-district figures on population below the poverty line are from World Food Program and are 
based on local poverty maps. This relates to the proportion of people in the sub-district living below the 
national lower poverty line. This is used by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics to measure extreme 
poverty in the country, based on a food basket providing minimal nutritional requirements 
corresponding to 2,122 kcal/day/person. For further details, see Narayan, Yoshida and Zaman (2007) 
and Yoshida (2009). 
(d) absolute values of z-statistics are in parenthesis. 
(e) + denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level and ** 
denotes significance at the 1 per cent level. 
(f) ‘Travel time to nearest major city’ is in minutes (16 major cities were selected) and is for the year 
2000; data source: Local Government Engineering Department (LGED).  
(g) ‘Distance to nearest road’ is for the year 2000 and measures percentage of areas under each sub-
district within 2.5 km from major roads (national highway, regional highway, feeder road A and feeder 
road B); data source: LGED.  
(h) ‘Vulnerability to natural disaster’ is defined as percentage of areas within each sub-district prone to 
severe disaster: flood, river erosion, drought and cyclone; data source: LGED and the Bangladesh 
Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization.  
(i) Female (aged 7 years or older) literacy data are from 2001 population Census. 
(j) School age data are from 2011 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Census.  
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potential teachers. To this end, Table 5 additionally reports a specification (see model 
2) that controls for female literacy rate in the sub-district.24 In case of ROSC schools, 
the coefficient on the literacy variable is negative and significant. But, it is positive 
and significant in case of BRAC schools. The bank variable also loses significance in 
model 2.  
 
Overall, ROSC schools have higher presence in sub-districts with poor infrastructure, 
implying that they are better targeted, while BRAC schools concentrate in better-
developed parts of a poor district. This finding is consistent with the existing literature 
on NGO branch placement in Bangladesh (for example, Mallick and Nabin 2011). 
Mallick and Nabin find that NGOs in Bangladesh operate in locations with good 
physical infrastructure and better productive and marketing opportunities and they do 
so to minimise operating costs. Using data from northern Bangladesh, they find that 
NGO coverage in a village (measured as number of working NGOs) decreased with 
distance of the village from marketplace and increased with adoption of modern 
irrigation methods and soil quality. The NGOs did not consider poverty incidence in 
the village.25 The findings on BRAC school location are also consistent with the fact 
that these schools are run primarily by locally recruited female teachers and are 
therefore set up in areas with adequate supply of female graduates of secondary 
schools. This pattern of location is similar to that of for-profit private schools in 
Pakistan that have emerged in locations that have previously benefited from public 
investment in female secondary schools (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja 2013).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Non-governmental organisations play an increasingly important role in the delivery of 
public services in developing countries. But, little systematic evidence is available 
about where in Bangladesh NGO-run schools open alongside government-run non-
formal schools. I present a comparative analysis of location choice of one of the 
largest non-formal school models in Bangladesh, BRAC-run primary schools and its 
replication, ROSC project schools, and compare both with location choice of another 
pro-poor school—madrasa. Not-for-profit, non-state schools are popular options for 
educating out-of-school children in poor countries. By way of studying the empirical 
determinants of geographical location of BRAC vis-à-vis ROSC schools in 
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Bangladesh, I fill an important gap in the international literature on the strategic 
choice of NGO-run development programs in low income countries.  
 
A number of findings follow from the analysis. First, BRAC, ROSC and madrasa 
schools are all found to have a significantly high concentration in poor areas. 
However, I find that ROSC schools have higher concentration in poor sub-districts, 
compared to BRAC (and madrasa) schools. In particular, the ROSC program has 
greater presence in regions that are remote (in terms of access to cities and roads), 
have fewer banks and working toilets and are vulnerable to natural disasters. On the 
contrary, location decision of BRAC schools is negatively related with low 
infrastructure. Second, ROSC schools have a greater presence in regions that are 
under-served by government and government-supported formal primary schools. On 
the other hand, the supply of BRAC schools (and madrasas) is significantly and 
positively associated with the number of formal primary schools. This analysis also 
shows that the positive association between BRAC school counts and infrastructure is 
partly explained by the fact that well-provided areas also have higher female literacy 
rate, making it easier for BRAC to recruit female teachers. However, no such 
evidence is present in case of ROSC schools. These findings suggest that, contrary to 
the popular media commentaries (for example, Rosenberg 2013), BRAC schools 
behave strategically, compared to ROSC schools, when catering to the educationally 
underprivileged population. The latter does a better job in targeting regions where 
socioeconomic circumstances are most likely to keep children out of school.  
 
This study therefore adds to the existing evidence on the entry of NGOs in poor 
pockets of relatively well-developed areas, rather than in remoter, less-developed 
regions (Sharma and Zeller 1999) and into communities that are already being catered 
for by other service providers (Fruttero and Gauri 2005). The findings imply that 
evaluation of the performance of NGO programs is likely to suffer from positive 
selection bias (Chowdhury and Bhuiya 2004). The evidence also cautions against the 
strategy where developing country governments and aid agencies consider NGO-run 
pro-poor schools as the most effective means of bringing children from isolated 
communities into mainstream education. Further low-cost innovation in NGO service 
delivery models26 should be emphasised to ensure that children in difficult-to-reach 
communities are equally served by NGO programs. Another example would be 
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BRAC’s encouragement and execution of research studies such as this one in order to 
improve school targeting in practice and bring it more into line with its objective of 
reaching the poorest and most deprived families. 
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Table A1 Counts of Schools, Enrolment Share and Examination Performance of 
Different Types of Primary Schools in Bangladesh 
 
School type 
Count of school types 
Enrolment 
sharea 
Student 
performance 
Annual school 
Census (ASC) 
2011 record 
National examination 
2011 record 
Total students 
enrolled 
Pass rateb in 
2011 
national 
exam 
N % N % % % 
Government primary school 37,670 41.99 37,651 37.90 56.02 93.67 
Registered non-government school 20,168 22.48 21,336 21.48 21.27 89.91 
Private school (kindergarten) 10,538 11.75 11,229 11.30 7.67 93.68 
Madrasac 6,428 7.17 11,519 11.59 5.75 78.01 
BRACe 4,390 4.89 6,488 6.53 1.62 95.08 
ROSCf 2,344 2.61 2,134 2.15 0.91 46.28 
Non-government unregistered 
school 1,486 1.66 2,237 2.25 1.50 83.83 
School (secondary attached) d 1,494 1.67 1,770 1.78 2.58 93.79 
Other 5,189 5.78 4,987 5.02 2.68 – 
Total 89,707 100.00 99,351 100.00 
(18.96 
million) 
100.00 – 
Notes: (a) Enrolment share data are from 2012 ASC. 
(b) Pass rate refers to ‘Pass rate, as percentage of eligible students’ and corresponds to Terminal 
Examination (national primary school completion exam) 2011. 
(c) Madrasa includes those attached to secondary madrasa.  
(d) For primary schools, while we know which are attached to a secondary school, we do not know 
whether they are government aided or not. Hence, this category has been left out.  
(e) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
(f) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
 
Table A2 Distribution of School Types by Year of Establishment (%) 
Period of establishment Government school ROSCa school BRACb school Madrasa school 
On/before 1970 85.74 0 0.00 23.17 
1971–1980 13.22 0 0.00 21.56 
1981–1990 0.82 0 0.00 30.48 
1991–2000 0.22 0 0.89 19.01 
2001+ 0.00 100 99.11 5.93 
Notes: (a) ROSC denotes Reaching-out-of-School. 
(b) BRAC denotes Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
Source: Data are from 2011 Annual School Census. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1. For instance, the Department for International Development of the UK Government, together with 
AusAID of the Australian Government, has recently entered into a ‘Strategic Partnership Arrangement’ 
(SPA) with BRAC to provide GBP358 million over 5 years. A key objective of SPA is to support 
BRAC’s non-formal primary education scheme for 680,000 children (Tran 2012). Similarly, the 
Australian Government is co-funding 1,200 BRAC schools in the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao of the Philippines (Jacinto 2014). 
2. The NGO education sector is highly skewed, with BRAC receiving about three-fourths of donor 
resources and accounting for a similar share of primary enrolment in NGO schools (Alamgir et 
al2006). More than 500 NGOs run short or full non-formal primary education programs in Bangladesh 
which focus on getting children from disadvantaged areas or groups into school and eventually into 
formal schools from Grade 3 or above.  
3. The Economist 2012, ‘The path through the fields’, 3 November. 
4. See Ahmed (2008) and Farrell and Hartwell (2008) for two recent (and qualitative) reviews of non-
formal school programs.  
5. Chabbott also estimates the cost per BRAC school-completer is $84, around one-third that of $246 
for those from government public schools. 
6. Apart from ROSC model, there are other education programs targeting under-privileged populations. 
In 2005, the BNFE was established to provide management and oversight of non-formal education 
initiatives in all 64 districts. It implements the ‘Basic Education for the Hard to Reach Urban Working 
Children’ project in six divisional cities and provides quality non-formal and life skills-based education 
to 0.2 million urban working children and adolescents aged 10 to 14 years (UNICEF 2009).  
7. However, day-to-day management of ROSC schools, including activities such as establishment of 
the school, involves a number of actors such as parents or guardians, a local education officer, a local 
administrative officer, a NGO representative, the head of the local government primary school, a 
person from the community and the teacher of the ROSC school. 
8. Although BRAC school students do not receive any government financial incentives, the cost is paid 
for by the school, rather than the household. Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee pays for 
everything (for example, textbooks, notebooks, other educational materials and teacher salary), except 
for the maintenance of the classroom, which is the responsibility of the community (Haiplik 2002; 
Haiplik 2004; Li et al. 2016). However, students of government schools and non-government registered 
schools and madrasas have benefited from various financial incentive schemes, such as food-for-
education and cash-for-education, in the last two decades. For a discussion of these schemes, see World 
Bank (2013).  
9. For a detailed comparison of the main characteristics of ROSC schools, compared to BRAC and 
government primary schools, see Dang, Sarr and Asadullah (2011). 
10. International literature on the topic is limited. Two exceptions are Barr and Fafchamps (2006) and 
Brass (2012). The sub-national NGO location of Brass (2012) corresponds to an area’s objective level 
of need, as well as the convenience of the location for accessing beneficiaries, donors and elite goods. 
Barr and Fafchamps (2006) find that Ugandan NGOs neglect remote communities, possibly for cost 
reasons. The evidence also suggests that NGOs operate in the same location, irrespective of presence of 
other NGO programs.  
11. Only in most unusual circumstances, BRAC recruits an unmarried woman. This is because only 
one teacher is hired for each school, who is expected to teach for a minimum of 3 years. But, in case of 
unmarried women, the risk of out-migration following marriage is high. 
12. Using survey data from five north Indian states, Pal (2010) finds that even after controlling for all 
other factors, access to village infrastructure facilities is associated with a higher likelihood of having a 
private school in the community. 
13. Habitation size determines school size, which in turn influences characteristics such as the number 
of teachers employed (Kochar 2004). 
14. For Pakistan, Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2013) find that the boom in private schooling is driven by 
the availability of low-cost, female teachers. The data show that private schools arise precisely in those 
villages where there exists a pool of educated women, which in turn are far more common in areas 
where there exists a government girls’ secondary school. Due to a lack of outside opportunities, these 
women have lower wage rates than educated men. These low wages are then passed onto the students 
in terms of low fees in the competitive market. 
15. Pal (2010) use data on proportion of female teachers and vacant teaching positions in local 
government schools, pucca school building and school’s access to drinking water.  
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16. The coverage of ROSC schools, however, remains comparable in 2011 ASC and 2011 Terminal 
Examination data (2,344 and 2,13, respectively). For instance, under the ROSC project, Directorate of 
Primary Education coordinates learning centres known as ‘Ananda schools’. According to the ROSC 
report (ROSC Project Office Unit 2009), there were just over 700,000 students enrolled in 21,500 
ROSC centres. 
17. There is some evidence that suggests that madrasas pay their teachers less, compared to 
government and private schools (World Bank 2010). 
18. At the same time, students of BRAC schools are also from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, 
compared to government school students, yet the performance of BRAC schools is on par with student 
performance of government schools. 
19. Indeed, ROSC schools have significantly higher concentration in haor and char areas (Directorate 
of Primary Education  2012b). Division-wise breakdown of the sub-district level school counts also 
confirms this. An average sub-district in Barisal has nearly 36 madrasas, compared to only three private 
schools, 11 BRAC schools and five ROSC schools. Dhaka and Chittagong appear to have the highest 
concentration of private schools. On the other hand, north-western divisions of Rajshahi and Rangpur 
have highest concentration of BRAC schools at the sub-district level. Sylhet division (where most 
haors are located) has a high concentration of ROSC schools and a relatively lower presence of BRAC 
schools.  
20. Nonetheless, in case of madrasas, a sizeable proportion has existed for several decades. For this 
older sub-set of madrasas, I cannot rule out the possibility of simultaneity bias vis-à-vis the supply of 
government primary schools in the absence of panel data. This remains a limitation of this study. 
21. The finding of higher concentration of madrasas in poorer sub-districts is also consistent with 
analysis of enrolment data, which consistently report a negative correlation between household income 
and madrasa attendance (see Asadullah, Chakrabarti and Chaudhury 2015). 
22. I plotted data on school counts against out-of-school population in the sub-district. The latter was 
extracted from 2011 population Census report (results not reported). Compared to BRAC and madrasa 
schools, number of ROSC schools in a sub-district was positively associated with the out-of-school 
population, confirming that ROSC schools target regions with large presence of children out of school. 
23. The Economist 2012, ‘The path through the fields’, 3 November. 
24. Ideally, we need information on potential teachers (for example, proportion of women aged 18 
years and above with minimum secondary school qualifications). Since such data are not available, we 
use female literacy rate as a proxy. 
25. A similar conclusion is reached by Wadood, Mahmoud and Khalily (2012), who examined entry 
decision of micro-finance institutions in Tangail district of Bangladesh. Both large and small micro-
finance institutions were found to choose economically more prosperous locations. The studies by 
Sharma and Zeller (1999), Mallick and Nabin (2011) and Wadood, Mahmoud and Khalily (2012) 
therefore support the view that pragmatic and organisational concerns, instead of charitable 
motivations, are the principal determinants of NGO’s location decisions in Bangladesh. 
26. One example is BRAC’s ‘floating school’ pilot scheme to educate children in remote parts of the 
Philippines (Jacinto 2014). 
